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Abstract
This paper analyzes the impact of relaxing fertility controls and expanding social security
in China. We develop an overlapping generations model in which fertility decisions and capital
accumulation are endogenously determined in the presence of social security. In our model,
children are an alternative savings technology—as they transfer resources to their retired parents.
Important feedback links arise between fertility and social security variables: an expansion of
social security benefits reduces fertility— partially offsetting the effects of relaxing the one-child
policy. The feedback loop between social security variables and fertility suggests that abandoning
fertility restrictions may not be as effective in helping to finance China’s intended pension reform,
especially if children are an important source of old-age support. The sustainability of the pension
system is particularly at risk in the event of a growth slowdown. The objective of pension
reforms may also be incongruent with other reforms, such as financial liberalization and financial
integration.
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1 Introduction
The Chinese government is currently undertaking important social security reforms. At present,
about half of urban workers are covered by the pension program, while the vast majority of the
rural area remains uncovered. Nation-wide, only 31% of China’s total workforce, urban and rural
combined, is eligible for a public pension of any kind. Coincidentally, intra-family support, on which
most Chinese elderly traditionally relied, is weakening as a consequence of families having fewer
children. Without imminent reforms, tens of millions of Chinese could arrive in old age without
pensions or adequate family support in the next few decades. As a result, the government set out a
goal to make the pension program national in scope—reaching full coverage by the year 2020.1
However, the challenge of building a national pension system could hardly be more daunting.
Demographic aging, due to fertility controls, makes the reform all at once more pressing and more
delicate. The ‘one-child policy’, whose implementation started in the early 1980’s,2 indeed fostered
a rapid demographic transition in China and will soon lead to a sharp rise in the ratio of retirees to
middle-aged workers: as the share of the elderly in the total population is expected to double between
now and 2050, the old age dependency ratio could almost triple and come close to one (Table 1).
Concerns over pressure on the social security program are echoed in works such as Feldstein (1999),
Barr and Diamond (2010), Nakashima et al. (2009), and Song et al. (2013), among others.
Table 1: Demographic Structure in China
1970 2010 2050
Share of Young (% of individuals aged 0-30) 65% 42% 28%
Share of Middle-Aged (% of individuals aged 30-60) 28% 44% 39%
Share of Elderly (% of individuals above 60) 7% 14% 33%
Median Age 19.7 34.5 48.7
Fertility (number of children per woman, urban areas) 3.18 1.04 n/a
Note: UN World Population Prospects (2011). The fertility number for the year 1970 (resp. 2010) corresponds to the
average fertility over the period 1965-70 (resp. 2004-2009).
In November 2013, the Third Plenary Session announced the much-anticipated relaxation of the
one-child policy—partly to slowdown the aging of the society, and partly to help relieve pressure on
the financing of social security. But to what extent can the relaxation of fertility controls actually
aid pension reforms? The question needs to be addressed in an appropriate framework that takes
into account China’s particular institutional and social norm. One important aspect of the Chinese
society is that children are often the main source of old-age support. Until recently, the absence of
1Hu Jintao’s report at the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party, October 15, 2007.
2The one-child policy aimed at curbing the rapid population growth following Mao’s pro-natality program.
Household-level data (Urban Household Survey) indicates a strict enforcement of the policy in urban areas in China:
over the period 2000-2009, 96% of urban households that had children had only one child. The policy however was
significantly less strict in rural areas. According to Census data, the urban fertility rate fell from a bit above 3 in 1970
to close to 1 by 1982 (see Choukhmane et al. (2014)).
social safety net has meant that retirees relied to a large extent on children’s support. According to
Census data in 2005, family support is the main source of income for more than half of the elderly
(65+) urban population (see Choukhmane et al. (2014)). In rural areas where pension coverage is
particularly low, family support is even more essential for elderly (see Chapter 3 in Cai et al. (2012)).
However, to the extent that there is some substitutability between social security and reliance on
children, people may decide to have fewer children when social security benefits increase. This might
in turn reduce future contributions necessary to sustain the reform.
In order to take these considerations into account, we develop a framework that allows for endoge-
nous fertility in an overlapping generations model with capital accumulation and intergenerational
transfers—in the form of family support and social security.3 In the model, individuals decide on
how many children to bear at the end of their youth period. In middle age, they raise children (at
a cost), contribute to the pension program, and transfer resources to their parents. Old retirees
consume all available resources, which include social security benefits and offspring’s transfers.
This economy is characterized by three key relationships in the steady state. The first is a positive
relationship between fertility and interest rates based on optimal savings and investment decisions.
A greater number of children increases the marginal productivity of capital and thus investment.
Moreover, it is associated with higher expenditures and larger transfers in old age, both of which
lead to lower savings. Higher fertility thus leads to higher interest rates. The second condition is
a negative relationship based on optimal fertility choices: a higher interest rate lowers the financial
benefits of children (relative to capital) and hence discourages fertility. The third key relationship is
determined by the sustainability of the social security system, which embeds the impact of fertility
and growth on the viability of the program. We show analytically how the interactions of these
relationships conjoin to determine the interest rate, fertility and social security contribution rates in
the long run. Children in this framework are both ‘consumptions goods’ and ‘investment goods’—in
the sense that they transfer resources to support their parents in old age. A change in the social
security system alters incentives to have children, both because social security variables (taxes and
benefits) alter consumption and thus the demand for children, and because social security affects the
investment return on children— via changes in the interest rate, or to the extent that more generous
pension benefits can crowd out intra-family transfers to the elderly.
Our framework applied to China shows that relaxing the one-child policy can aid an expansion
of pension through an increase in fertility — but that rise is partly offset through three channels.
First, insofar as children are considered investment goods, greater reliance on social security and
less transfers coming from children means that desired fertility drops. Second, to the extent that
children are also consumption goods, social security expansion, financed partly by higher taxes,
lowers consumption in middle age and therefore also optimal fertility. Third, the rise in the interest
rate occasioned by a fall in national savings also leads to a reduction in desired fertility. Lower
fertility requires higher tax rates, which further lowers fertility—and so and so forth. This feedback
loop between social security variables and fertility suggests that the effectiveness of abandoning the
3Our theory relates to earlier work linking fertility and intergenerational (public or private) transfers such as
Nishimura and Zhang (1992), Boldrin and Jones (2002), Boldrin, de Nardi and Jones (2005), Ehrlich and Kim (2005)
and Yew and Zhang (2009).
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one-child policy in terms of its impact on financing the pension reforms may be overstated —when
endogenous fertility considerations are ignored. In the event of a growth slowdown—a likely scenario
in China in the coming decades— the circumstances would only become worse. The fertility increase
as a consequence of the birth-control relaxation is even more limited because a slower rate of growth
reduces expected future transfers—and thus the benefits of having children. Financing the social
security expansion thus requires an even more significant rise in taxes.
We also investigate how social security reforms might interact with capital markets reforms. We
consider two reforms (1) domestic financial liberalization and (2) lifting capital controls. Those two
reforms have qualitatively similar consequences as they both increase repressed interest rates. By
raising the return on savings, they reduce the benefits from children and depress further fertility. As
a consequence, they exert further pressure on the financing of social security. In our framework, the
Chinese government faces a severe tension between expanding the generosity of the pension system
and deepening capital markets liberalization—particularly so if growth slows.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the basic elements of the framework and
the relationships governing the key endogenous variables in the economy. An analytically tractable
case of a PAYGO system in the long run is analyzed in Section 3. Section 4 shows the dynamics
of the model under various policy experiments. Section 5 concludes. All proofs are relegated in the
Appendix.
2 Model
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of agents who live for three periods: youth
(y), middle age (m), and old age (o). Agents supply one unit of labor when young and middle-aged,
and retire when old. Before entering middle age, individuals decide how many children to have. Let
nt denote the number of children (per young individual) born at the end of period t. Demographics
evolves according to Lo,t+2 = Lm,t+1 = Ly,t = nt−1Ly,t−1, where Lγ,t denotes the size of generation
γ ∈ {y,m, o} in period t.
2.1 Production
Let Kt−1 denote the aggregate capital stock at the beginning of period t and etLy,t + Lm,t the total
labor input employed in period t, where et denotes the relative efficiency of young workers (et < 1).
The gross output is
Yt = K
α
t−1 [At (etLy,t + Lm,t)]
1−α ,
where At is labor-augmenting productivity, and 0 < α < 1. Productivity grows at an exogenous
(gross) rate gA,t, so that At = gA,tAt−1.
Factor markets are competitive. Thus, the wage rates per unit of labor in youth and middle age
are
wy,t = et(1− α)Atk
α
t−1, wm,t = (1− α)Atk
α
t−1, (1)
where kt−1 ≡ Kt−1/[At(etLy,t + Lm,t)] denotes the capital-effective-labor ratio. The rental rate
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earned by capital in production equals the marginal product of capital, rK,t = αk
α−1
t−1 . We assume
full depreciation of capital for simplicity.4 Therefore the gross rate of return earned between period
t− 1 and t is
Rt = αk
α−1
t−1 . (2)
2.2 The Social Security System
Our modelling of the social security system is flexible enough to encapsulate a pay-as-you-go system
(PAYGO), a fully-funded system, or more generally some combination of the two. Young and
middle-aged agents in period t pay a Social Security tax proportional to their labor income, at
the contribution rate τt. A retiree in period t receives social security benefits in the amount of
σtwm,t−1, where σt denotes the replacement ratio in that period.
The government runs the social security system and can accumulate assets in a trust fund to
finance the system. Let Bt ≥ 0 denote the government’s asset position at the end of period t. The
government’s flow budget constraint in period t+ 1 is
τt+1(Ly,t+1wy,t+1 + Lm,t+1wm,t+1) +Rt+1Bt = Lo,t+1σt+1wm,t +Bt+1. (3)
The left hand side of the equation represents the sources of funds for the Social security system in
period t + 1, which consist of Social Security taxes plus gross returns on assets. The right hand
side represents the uses of funds by the Social Security system in that period, including retirement
benefits paid to the elderly and the purchase of capital to hold in the trust fund. Using (1) and (2),
the government’s flow budget constraint can be rewritten as
nt−1gA,t+1 (1 + ntet+1)
1 + nt−1et
(
kt
kt−1
)α
[(1− α)τt+1 − bt+1] + αk
α−1
t bt =
1− α
1 + nt−1et
σt+1, (4)
where bt ≡
Bt
Yt
denotes government assets as a share of GDP. Equation (4) governs the dynamics
of the social security system, defined by the set of variables {bt, τt, σt}, for a given evolution of the
endogenous state variables {kt, nt}. This equation makes clear the impact of growth and the interest
rate on the financing of the social security system. Higher growth between periods t and t+1—driven
by productivity, demographics, or capital accumulation— tends to relax the government’s budget
constraint through its impact on tax revenues relative to benefit spendings — although it also implies
higher investment into capital assets for a given bt+1 > 0. If the government holds a positive asset
position (bt > 0), a higher rate of return on capital (αk
α−1
t ) also increases revenues.
2.3 Households
Consider an individual who is young in period t. The individual earns the competitive wage rate
wy,t when young, and wm,t+1 in the next period. At the end of period t, the agent decides on the
number of children nt to bear. In the next period, the agent pays the cost of raising kids and makes
4This assumption is rather innocuous and quantitatively unimportant given that a period corresponds to one gen-
eration.
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a transfer to his elderly parents, for a total amount of Tm,t+1. When retired, the individual consumes
all available resources, which consist of gross return on accumulated assets, social security transfers
(σt+2wm,t+1), and transfers received from children To,t+2. The lifetime utility of the agent, which
includes the utility derived from children, is
Ut = log(cy,t) + v log(nt) + β log(cm,t+1) + β
2 log(co,t+2)
where 0 < β < 1, and v > 0 reflects the preference for children. The agent faces the following
sequence of budget constraints:
cy,t + ay,t = (1− τt)wy,t
cm,t+1 + am,t+1 = (1− τt+1)wm,t+1 +Rt+1ay,t − Tm,t+1 (5)
co,t+2 = Rt+2am,t+1 + σt+2wm,t+1 + To,t+2,
where aγ,t denotes the net asset holdings at the end of period t by an agent of generation γ.
Intra-Family Transfers. The cost of raising kids falls in the mold of a time cost that is proportional
to middle-aged labor income and to the number of children, φntwm,t+1, where φ > 0. These costs
can be interpreted as ‘mouth-to-feed’ costs and education expenses.5 Transfers from a middle-aged
individual to his parents in period t + 1 amount to a fraction ψt+1
(
n̟−1t−1 /̟
)
of the wage rate
wm,t+1, where ̟ ∈ (0, 1]. Ascending transfers constitute an important feature of Chinese society
(see Choukhmane et al. (2014)). As in Choukhmane et al. (2014), we assume that the fraction of
labor income transferred to parents is (weakly) decreasing in the number of siblings—to capture the
possibility of free-riding among siblings who share the burden of parent support.6 The extent of free-
riding is measured by 1−̟. The magnitude of transfers towards parents depends on the replacement
rate, ψt+1 = Ψ(σt+1), with Ψ(.) > 0 decreasing and convex. This assumption exogenously captures
the possibility that increasing social security benefits might crowd out intra-family support.
The combined amount of resources transferred in period t + 1 by a middle-aged agent to his
children and parents thus satisfies
Tm,t+1 =
(
φnt + ψt+1
n̟−1t−1
̟
)
wm,t+1. (6)
When retired, the agent receives transfers from his nt children, for a total amount
To,t+2 = ψt+2
n̟t
̟
wm,t+2. (7)
5Implicitly, we assume that transfers from the middle-aged to their children are consumed in an interim childhood
period, between the time agents are born and the time they enter the labor market — or equivalently, the cost of raising
kids is a pure resource cost. Having the transfers appear in the young’s budget constraint would make no substantial
difference as long as the credit constraint on the young is binding (see next paragraph).
6See Boldrin and Jones (2002) for a model where ascending transfers are decreasing in the number of siblings as the
outcome of a strategic game between siblings.
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Credit Constraints. Young agents are subject to credit constraints: a young agent in period t
can only borrow up to a fraction θt of the present value of his future labor income. Tight credit
constraints are relevant in the case of China, where credit markets are still underdeveloped (see
Coeurdacier, Guibaud and Jin (2014)). Domestic financial liberalization can be interpreted as an
increase in θt over time. For simplicity, we proceed under the assumption that the credit constraint
on the young is binding in all periods, and thus7
ay,t = −θt
wm,t+1
Rt+1
. (8)
Middle-Aged Savings. The assumption of log utility implies that the optimal consumption by a
middle-aged agent is a constant fraction of his intertemporal wealth, which consists of disposable
income (current wage net of Social Security tax and previous period debt repayment), minus transfers
to children and parents, plus the present value of transfers (public and private) to be received in old
age:
cm,t+1 =
1
1 + β
[(
1− τt+1 − θt − φnt −
ψt+1n
̟−1
t−1
̟
)
wm,t+1 +
n̟t
̟
ψt+2wm,t+2
Rt+2
+
σt+2wm,t+1
Rt+2
]
.
It follows from Equation (5) that the optimal asset holding of a middle-aged individual is
am,t+1 =
β
1 + β
[(
1− τt+1 − θt − φnt −
ψt+1n
̟−1
t−1
̟
−
σt+2
βRt+2
)
wm,t+1 −
n̟t
β̟
ψt+2wm,t+2
Rt+2
]
. (9)
Equation (9) shows the partial equilibrium effects of fertility, the social security system, and the
interest rate on the middle-aged’s savings. Higher fertility (nt) tends to reduce savings because of
higher spending on children, and because of higher transfers received from children in the future.
Similarly, higher social security contributions τt+1 and a higher expected replacement rate σt+2
reduce the amount of savings, by lowering current disposable income and increasing future wealth,
respectively. The income and substitution effects associated with changes in the interest rate (Rt+2)
cancel out under the assumption of log utility — but a lower interest rate, by increasing the present
value of future transfers, implies lower savings (‘wealth effect’).
Fertility. Fertility decisions hinge on equating the marginal utility of bearing an additional child to
the net marginal cost of raising the child:
v
nt
=
β
cm,t+1
(
φwm,t+1 −
ψt+2n
̟−1
t wm,t+2
Rt+2
)
. (10)
The right hand side is the net marginal cost, in utility terms, of having an additional child. In
pecuniary terms, the net marginal cost is equal to the cost of rearing one extra child, φwm,t+1, less
the present value of the impact of one additional child on the amount of transfers received in old age,
7For a given value of θt, the constraint is binding if the lifetime income profile is steep enough (e small enough
and/or gA high enough). We check in our simulations that the constraint is indeed always binding.
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∂To,t+2/∂nt. In this framework, children are at once ‘consumption goods’ (through the parameter
v) and ‘investment goods’ (through ψt+2). As of the end of period t, the return on children as a
savings vehicle, for fixed parameters φ and ψt+2, depends on the ratio of wage growth to interest
rate, wm,t+2/(wm,t+1Rt+2). A fall in this ratio reduces the returns to investing in children, and thus
discourages fertility. Equation (10) can be rewritten as
v
nt
=
β (1 + β)
(
φkαt −
ψt+2
α
n̟−1t gA,t+2kt+1
)
(
1− τt+1 − θt − φnt −
ψt+1
̟
n̟−1t−1
)
kαt +
ψt+2
α̟
n̟t gA,t+2kt+1 +
σt+2
α
k1−αt+1 k
α
t
, (11)
and is the first equation describing the dynamics of the two endogenous state variables {kt, nt}, for
a given path of social security variables {bt, τt, σt}t≥0.
2.4 Capital Market Equilibrium
The market clearing condition for capital equalizes the net asset holdings by households and the
government to the aggregate capital stock:
Ly,t+1ay,t+1 + Lm,t+1am,t+1 +Bt+1 = Kt+1.
Using Equations (8) and (9) along with Equations (1) and (2), the capital market clearing condition
can be rewritten as
ntgA,t+2kt+1
[
(1 + et+2nt+1) + θt+1
1− α
α
+
1
1 + β
ψt+2
̟
n̟−1t
1− α
α
]
(12)
=
βkαt
(1 + β)
[(
1− τt+1 − θt − φnt −
ψt+1
̟
n̟−1t−1
)
(1− α)−
σt+2
β
1− α
α
k1−αt+1 +
1 + β
β
(1 + et+1nt) bt+1
]
,
which gives the second equation describing the dynamics of the two endogenous state variables
{kt, nt} for a given path of social security variables. The dynamics of the economy is thus defined
by the equations for optimal fertility and capital market equilibrium, (11) and (12), along with a
path of social security variables {bt, τt, σt}t≥0 that satisfies the government’s budget constraint (4)
in every period. We now turn to the analysis of the model at its steady state.
2.5 Steady State
The steady state is characterized by constant productivity and credit condition parameters (et = e,
gA,t = gA, and θt = θ), constant social security variables (bt = b, τt = τ , σt = σ), and constant state
variables (kt = k, nt = n). To obtain analytical solutions for the steady state, we make the following
additional assumptions.
Assumption 1 No free-riding between siblings: ̟ = 1.
Assumption 2 No first-period labor income: et = 0 in every period.
Assumption 3 τ < 1− θ −Ψ(0).
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The first two assumptions are made for analytical convenience. Assumption 3 puts an upper bound
on the social security contribution rate and ensures that individuals want a strictly positive number
of children. With these assumptions we obtain the two fundamental relationships linking the interest
rate and fertility in the steady state, for a given social security system.
KK Curve. The first relationship derives from the capital market equilibrium condition, Equation
(12), and captures optimal savings decisions:
RKK(n) =
ngA (Θ + ψσ) + σ
β (1− τ − θ − φn− ψσ) + (1 + β)
b
1−α
, (13)
where ψσ ≡ Ψ(σ) and Θ ≡ (1 + β)
(
α
1−α + θ
)
. The KK curve is upward sloping with respect to n,
encapsulating four different channels through which the rate of return is positively linked to fertility.
The first is the standard effect that higher population growth (higher fertility) increases the marginal
productivity of capital. The second is that a greater number of children raises total expenditures,
which tends to reduce the savings of the middle-aged and drive up the rate of return (term φn in
the denominator). This channel disappears when the cost of raising kids φ goes to zero. The third
channel is related to ascending intra-family transfers. With higher fertility, middle-age savers expect
to receive larger transfers in old age—which lowers their savings and increases the interest rate (term
ngAψσ in the numerator). This channel disappears when ψσ goes to zero.
8 Fourth, higher fertility
increases the proportion of young borrowers and lowers aggregate savings through a composition
effect. This effect is dampened when θ is small. Hence, the steepness of the KK curve with respect
to n is larger whenever the cost of children (φ) is large, ascending altruism (ψσ) is large, or credit
constraints are not too tight (large θ).
Partial equilibrium comparative statics on RKK, holding the social security variables (b, τ, σ) and
fertility n fixed, yield
∂RKK
∂θ
> 0,
∂RKK
∂gA
> 0,
∂2RKK
∂ψσ∂gA
> 0.
Tighter credit constraints (lower θ) leads to less borrowing by young individuals and thus lowers
the interest rate. Higher productivity growth gA increases the interest rate by raising the marginal
productivity of capital. This effect tends to be magnified whenever ascending altruism (ψσ) is large.
The reason is that higher growth increases the future transfers received from children in old age and
therefore lowers incentives to save in middle age.
NN Curve. The second key relationship derives from Equation (11) and captures optimal fertility
decisions:
RNN (n) =
ngAψσ + λσ
nφ− λ (1− τ − θ − ψσ)
, (14)
8The simplifying assumption ̟ = 1 (Assumption 1) matters for the response of the interest rate to changes in
fertility. With ̟ ∈ (0, 1), the third channel (‘future transfer’ channel) through which higher fertility increases the
interest rate is dampened, as transfers received in old age increase less than proportionally with the number of children.
On the other hand, ̟ < 1 also implies that higher fertility reduces ascending transfers from the middle-aged, thereby
increasing their savings and lowering the interest rate.
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where λ ≡ v
v+β(1+β) . Differentiating with respect to n yields
∂RNN
∂n
= −λ
(1− τ − θ − ψσ) gAψσ + σφ
[nφ− λ (1− τ − θ − ψσ)]
2 < 0.
Assumption 3 ensures that the NN curve is downward sloping with respect to n. There are essentially
two forces driving this result. First, to the extent that children are ‘investment goods’, a higher
interest rate tends to lower the returns from children and thus discourages fertility (term in gAψσ).
This effect disappears when ψσ goes to zero: fertility is more sensitive to interest rate changes when
ascending intra-family transfers are important. Second, insofar as children are also ‘consumption
goods’, higher interest rates, by lowering the present value of future social security benefits and
thereby intertemporal wealth, lowers consumption—and hence also fertility (term proportional to
σφ). This effect disappears in the absence of social security σ = 0.
Inverting Equation (14), we obtain the following partial equilibrium comparative statics on the
steady state level of fertility n, holding the social security system (b, τ, σ) and the interest rate fixed:
∂n
∂φ
< 0,
∂n
∂v
> 0,
∂n
∂θ
< 0,
∂n
∂gA
> 0.
These inequalities indicate how the NN curve shifts in response to changes in some of the parameters
of the model. For a given R, a higher cost of raising kids or a lower preference for children reduces
fertility. A loosening of credit constraints (higher θ) reduces disposable income for consumption
when middle-aged and thus the demand for children. Most relevant to our analysis is the effect of
growth (gA): a growth slowdown, holding R fixed, is associated with lower returns on children and
thus lower fertility. This effect is absent when ψσ = 0.
Taking the social security system as given, the KK and NN curves together determine a unique
steady-state equilibrium.
Proposition 1 For a given social security scheme (b, τ, σ), a steady-state equilibrium for fertility
and the interest rate exists and is unique. The state level of fertility n lies in the interval (n, n),
where
n ≡ λ
1− τ − θ − ψσ
φ
,
n ≡
1− τ − θ − ψσ
φ
+
1 + β
β(1− α)
b > n.
Steady State under Laissez-Faire. We now characterize fertility and the interest rate (n0, R0) in
the laissez-faire steady state—i.e., in the absence of a social security system (τ = σ = b = 0). This
benchmark case is useful to build intuition on the mechanisms of the model. Letting ψ0 ≡ Ψ(0), we
9
obtain from Equations (13) and (14)
R0 =
(
λΘ+ (β + λ)ψ0
βφ(1 − λ)
)
gA,
n0 =
(
λΘ+ (β + λ)ψ0
Θ+ (1 + β)ψ0
)
1− θ − ψ0
φ
.
A fall in productivity growth gA lowers the equilibrium interest rate as the marginal productivity of
capital falls. However, the rate of productivity growth does not affect fertility under laissez-faire.9 A
loosening of credit constraints (higher θ, also implying higher Θ) leads to lower fertility and a higher
interest rate (through higher borrowing of the young and lower disposable income of the middle-aged-
savers). Figure 1 depicts the laissez-faire equilibrium under two sets of parameter values. In the top
panel, children are mostly ‘investment goods’ and intra-family transfers are the main motive driving
the demand for children (v → 0). The NN curve is almost horizontal in that case: any movement of
the KK curve will have a very large impact on fertility, and very little impact on the interest rate.
To the opposite, when preference for children is the main motive for fertility (v > 0 and ψ0 → 0),
the NN curve is almost vertical in the equilibrium region (bottom panel): any movement of the KK
curve will have a very large impact on the interest rate, and very little impact on fertility. Hence a
rise in the replacement rates which shifts the KK curve leftward will engender very different effects
on the economy depending on whether intra-family transfers are important or not.
3 Social Security Policies: Steady State Analysis
We now proceed to analyze how the introduction of a social security system affects fertility and the
interest rate at the steady state in our framework. Under Assumption 2, the government’s budget
constraint, Equation (11), becomes
σ
ngA
− τ =
(
R
ngA
− 1
)
b
1− α
(15)
in the steady state. The left hand-side is the (primary) government deficit in a given period, where
expenditures are captured by the replacement rate σ divided by the rate of demographic growth (i.e.,
ratio of contributing workers to retirees) times the rate of productivity growth. Higher economic
growth (either through fertility or productivity) relaxes the government’s budget constraint. In a
PAYGO system (b = 0), the contribution and replacement rates must satisfy the condition τ =
σ/(ngA). If the government holds a positive asset position (b > 0), the government can use the
return on its assets to finance a primary deficit if the interest rate is high compared to economic
growth R > ngA. On the contrary, in the case in which R < ngA, the government must run a primary
surplus to maintain its level of capital asset holdings to GDP constant.
9This result is the outcome of two counteracting effects that exactly offset each other. On the one hand, lower
productivity growth reduces incentives to have children (NN curve shifts to the left). On the other hand, it also reduces
the marginal productivity of capital and the interest rate (KK curve shifts downwards), which increases fertility. Note
that a change in gA leaves the ratio of wage growth to interest rate (gA/R), and therefore the incentives to have
children, unaffected.
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Figure 1: Steady-State Equilibrium under Laissez-Faire.
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Notes: Low v and high ψ0. Parameters values: β = 0.99 (annual basis), gA−1 = 4.5% (annual basis), v = 1%, θ = 1%,
α = 30%, φ = 8%, ψ0 = 20%.
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Notes: High v and low ψ0. Parameters values: β = 0.99 (annual basis), gA − 1 = 4.5% (annual basis), v = 15%,
θ = 1%, α = 30%, φ = 8%, ψ0 = 2%.
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To determine the steady state equilibrium with social security, we take two of the social security
variables (b, τ, σ) as exogenously given and let the third one adjust endogenously. In what follows,
we focus on scenarios in which the government targets a given level of asset over GDP (b) and a
certain replacement rate (σ), while letting the Social Security tax rate (τ) adjust.10
3.1 Fertility and Social Security Taxes in a PAYGO System
To start with, we focus on a PAYGO system (b = 0) where the government targets a certain replace-
ment rate σ = σ¯. Equations (13), (14) and (15) together determine the equilibrium fertility, interest
rate, and contribution rate in the steady state. Letting ψσ¯ ≡ Ψ(σ¯), the equilibrium (nσ¯, Rσ¯, τσ¯) must
satisfy
Rσ¯ =
nσ¯gA (Θ + ψσ¯) + σ¯
β (1− τσ¯ − θ − φnσ¯ − ψσ¯)
(KK)
Rσ¯ =
nσ¯gAψσ¯ + λσ¯
nσ¯φ− λ (1− τσ¯ − θ − ψσ¯)
(NN)
τσ¯ =
σ¯
nσ¯gA
. (SS)
As shown in Lemma A-1 in the Appendix—provided that σ¯ is below a certain threshold, a steady
state equilibrium exists.11 Next, we characterize how the targeted level of the contribution rate σ¯
affects the steady state. To this end, we introduce the following assumption.
Assumption 4 |Ψ′(0)| < Mφ/gA, where M (defined in the Appendix) is strictly positive for α ≥
β
1+2β .
This assumption limits the fall in family transfers towards parents when the replacement rate
increases —so that the total share of middle-aged wages dedicated to intergenerational transfers
(τσ¯ + ψσ¯) rises when the replacement rate increases.
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 4, an increase in the replacement rate σ¯ in the neighborhood of
σ¯ = 0 causes fertility to fall: dnσ¯
dσ¯
< 0. The contribution rate increases with an elasticity above unity:
d log τσ¯
d log σ¯ > 1. The impact on the interest rate Rσ¯ is ambiguous.
As shown in the proof of Proposition 2, a stronger result (global rather than local) holds under the
additional restriction that v/ψσ¯ < β
(
α
1−α + θ
)−1
: in that case, any sustainable increase in σ¯ leads
to a fall in fertility. It is useful to illustrate graphically the main forces leading to this result in
terms of the KK and NN curves. Holding fertility constant, a rise in the replacement rate lowers
aggregate savings: the KK curve shifts to the left, lowering n along the NN curve. Moreover, if more
generous pension benefits crowd out intra-family support (Ψ′ < 0), incentives to have children are
10The analysis of the steady state in scenarios where the government lets σ (resp. b) adjust for given (τ, b) (resp.
given (τ, σ)) was included in an earlier version of the paper and is available upon request.
11Intuitively, the government cannot finance too high a replacement rate and still satisfy its budget constraint. As
shown in the proof of Lemma A-1, uniqueness of the steady state is not always guaranteed. In case multiple equilibria
exists, the comparative statics discussed in this section apply to the one with the lowest contribution rate.
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reduced: the NN curve also shifts to the left (downwards), causing a further drop in fertility. As σ¯
increases and n is lower, social security taxes τ must rise for the viability of the pension program
(SS). Higher taxes translate into lower savings (the KK curve shifts further to the left) and lower
demand for children (the NN curve shifts further to the left). A feedback loop between endogenous
taxes and fertility emerges: higher taxes lowers fertility, and a lower rate of fertility in turn feeds
back onto raising taxes further (to keep the pension program sustainable)— and so on and so forth.
This feedback loop from higher taxes to lower fertility amplifies the initial drop in fertility.
Figure 2 illustrates how the steady state changes when moving from laissez-faire (σ¯ = 0) to a
target replacement rate of σ¯ = 30%, for two different calibrations of the model. In the absence
of intra-family support (ψ0 → 0 and v > 0), the NN curve is almost vertical and fertility adjusts
very little to a rise in the replacement rate (bottom panel). In that case, a higher replacement
rate increases the interest rate. In the opposite case where intra-family transfers are important, the
NN curve is almost horizontal and fertility adjusts much more (top panel). This leads to a larger
increase in contribution rates to finance the pensions. The shift of the NN curve is amplified if a
higher replacement rate crowds out intra-family transfers more (i.e., when |Ψ′(.)| is higher). Thus,
contrary to a standard model where children are ‘consumption goods’, our theory incorporating
intra-family support can generate large changes in fertility and contribution rates when expanding
the social security system. Interestingly, more generous pension benefits can cause the interest rate
to fall when intra-family transfers are important (as seen in the top panel).
Productivity Growth and Social Security Adjustments. In sharp contrast to the laissez-faire
case, fertility is not independent of productivity growth gA under PAYGO. For a fixed replacement
rate σ¯, a fall in productivity growth requires an increase in the contribution rate τ to balance the
budget — thus lowering disposable income, consumption and hence the demand for children. The
fall in fertility forces the government to raise taxes further — inducing a further drop in fertility. The
long-run equilibrium is the outcome of this feedback loop between falling fertility and rising taxes.
The interest rate will be lower under slower productivity growth, due to the fall in the marginal
product of capital, even more so when intra-family transfers are important. The reason is that the
reduction in fertility exerts upward pressure on savings (net of investment) and thereby pushes down
the interest rate further. Most importantly, the impact of a fall in productivity growth on fertility
will be magnified if intra-family support is important as lower growth reduces the benefits from
children.
Financial Liberalization and Social Security Adjustments. Domestic financial liberalization
can be interpreted in our framework as a relaxation of credit constraints (i.e., a rise in θ). The
long-run implications of such reforms for fertility and contribution rates are qualitatively similar to
the ones induced by a rise in the replacement ratio. A rise in θ lowers savings — the KK curve
shifts upwards and fertility falls along the NN curve. Moreover, it also lowers disposable income and
middle-aged consumption, causing the NN curve shift to the left, depressing fertility even further. In
order to maintain a fixed replacement rate σ¯, taxes have to rise, feeding back onto lower fertility—
and so on an so forth. Moreover, the flatter the NN curve (i.e., intra-family support is important),
the larger will be the drop in fertility caused by domestic financial liberalization.
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Figure 2: From Laissez-Faire to PAYGO.
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Notes: Low v and high ψ0. Solid lines are for the Laissez-Faire (σ = τ = 0) and dashed lines for PAYGO with
σ¯ = 30%. Parameters values: β = 0.99 (annual basis), gA − 1 = 4.5% (annual basis), v = 1%, θ = 1%, α = 30%,
φ = 8%, ψ0 = 20%, ψσ¯ = ψ0.e
−0.5σ¯.
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Notes: High v and low ψ0. Solid lines are for the Laissez-Faire (σ = τ = 0) and dashed lines for PAYGO with σ¯ = 30%.
Parameters values: β = 0.99 (annual basis), gA − 1 = 4.5% (annual basis), v = 15%, θ = 1%, α = 30%, φ = 8%,
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−0.5σ¯ .
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3.2 PAYGO in a Small Open Economy
We now briefly examine the situation in which the country is a small open economy, taking the
world interest rate as given. While this assumption is arguably questionable in the case of China, it
is useful to build intuition regarding some key differences between an economy under autarky and
one that is integrated globally. The small open economy example corresponds to the limiting case
where the interest rate does not adjust at all. Analyzing this polar case is also helpful to understand
the dynamics of fertility and taxes following financial integration.
The dynamics of the model for a small open economy (SOE) are characterized by Equations
(4) and (11), with the capital-effective-labor ratio kt determined by the world interest rate in every
period. In the steady state, the KK curve is horizontal, at the level of the world interest rate R∗.
Under PAYGO (b = 0) and for a fixed replacement rate σ¯, the equilibrium fertility and contribution
rate (nσ¯, τσ¯) must satisfy
nσ¯gAψσ¯ + λσ¯
nσ¯φ− λ (1− τσ¯ − θ − ψσ¯)
= R∗ (NN)
τσ¯ =
σ¯
nσ¯gA
. (SS)
Comparative statics. In the high ψ0 case, where a rise in the replacement ratio leads to a fall in
interest rate in the autarky steady state (top panel of Fig. 2), the impact on fertility of an increase
in σ¯ is stronger in the SOE scenario than in a closed economy. Under financial integration, the KK
curve is horizontal: any shift to the left of the NN curve due to higher taxes generates a larger fall of
fertility as interest rates do not adjust downwards. Thus, if family transfers are important (high ψ0),
a rise in social security benefits will lead to a higher tax rise under financial integration. Fertility
also reacts more to a fall in productivity growth rate gA in an open economy. The reason is that in a
closed-economy setting, the fall in fertility due to lower growth is dampened by a fall in the interest
rate. When this dampening effect is shut off, fertility falls by more and is thus matched by a greater
increase in taxes to balance the budget. The impact of a productivity slowdown on fertility is also
magnified when intra-family transfers are important.
4 Application: Policy Reforms in China
We next examine the dynamic impact of important policy reforms and economic development in
China, with a focus on pending fertility policies and pension reforms. As our theoretical analysis has
demonstrated that capital market reforms and an eventual growth slowdown interact with the social
security system, we also take these highly relevant scenarios into consideration. Before turning to
the experiments, we first provide more details on the main pillars of the recent reform package in
China.
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4.1 The Chinese Context
As of 2005, most of the Chinese population is not covered by social security—notwithstanding an
early pension reform in the late nineties (see Song and Yang (2012) and Dunaway and Arora (2007)).
In urban areas, 48% of employees are covered in 2005 (Dunaway and Arora (2007)) and coverage is
highly concentrated among workers at state and collectively owned enterprises—who account for a
diminishing share of total employment. Most of the fast-growing private sector workforce, including
China’s population of rural migrants, remains uncovered. In the countryside, where old-age poverty
is most severe, formal retirement protection is virtually nonexistent. Rural workers are categorically
excluded from the basic pension system.12 Over the past few years, a series of government reform
initiatives were launched to push China’s retirement system to extend coverage nation-wide. The
government has stepped up efforts to broaden participation in the basic pension system beyond
its original base among workers at state and collectively owned enterprises—and has set a goal of
achieving universal coverage by 2020. This expansion is under way, though far from reaching the
end goal.
Traditionally, in the absence of social security, children supported parents in old age. Not only
are intergenerational support a social convention and a family institutional norm, it is also stipulated
by Constitutional law: “children who have come of age have the duty to support and assist their
parents” (article 49). The importance of intergenerational transfers is fully borne out by the data
(see a more detailed description in Choukhmane et al. (2014) and Cai et al. (2012)). According
to the Chinese census data in 2005, family support is on average the main source of income for
the elderly (65+) population. It is twice as large as pension income and wealth income combined.
The on-going pension reform aims at replacing traditional family support, which is under pressure
following the implementation of the one-child policy in the early 1980s.13 The drastic reduction in
fertility means that the previous generation of parents are able to rely less on children’s support
for their retirement. However, the rapid ageing of the Chinese population also hinders the plan to
expand the pension system.
Recently, The Third Plenum reform package was announced in November 2013. One of the main
pillars was the relaxation of the one-child policy. As a first step, it stipulated that couples in which
one member is an only child are allowed to have two children. This rule applies to most of the urban
couples currently planning to have children. A second main pillar pertained to financial market
reforms. This included accelerated capital account liberalization, and domestic interest rate liberal-
ization. Indeed, despite the rapid economic development in the last few decades, China has seen far
slower financial development. For instance, even with recent developments of the mortgage markets
in the late nineties, household debt and mortgage debt (as a share of GDP) are still remarkably
low—amounting to only 12% and 11% of GDP in 2008, respectively, about 1/8 of the levels observed
in the U.S..14 These imminent reforms—spanning from fertility policies, pension reforms, to finan-
12In 2005, only 4.7% of the elderly’s income came from pension in rural areas. This is in contrast to the 45.4% in
urban areas, with a large heterogeneity among urban workers (Cai et al. (2012)).
13The one-child policy is strictly enforced in urban areas and less so in rural areas. According to UHS data, 96% of
all urban households who had children had one child. The urban fertility rate fell from a bit above 3 in 1970 to close
to 1 by 1982.
14In 2008, U.S. household debt as a share of GDP (resp. mortgage debt as a share of GDP) are 95% (resp. 86%).
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cial market development—along with a likely growth slowdown— are particularly important in the
context of China. Given their impact on social security, we conduct in what follows a comprehensive
analysis of their joint impact in the most likely of circumstances.
4.2 Steady State and Calibration
In the policy experiments that follow, the economy always starts from a well-defined initial steady-
state under endogenous fertility. The calibration of the initial steady state under autarky is summa-
rized in Table 2, along with values for the structural parameters. The initial period corresponds to
1970, just prior to the implementation of fertility policies in China. While our exercise is not meant
to be quantitative, structural parameters are calibrated using reasonable values based on household
micro data (Urban Household Survey (UHS) for income and consumption data and China Health
and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS) for data on family transfers; see Choukhmane et al.
(2014) for a detailed description of the data). We focus on urban households for our calibration be-
cause data are mostly available for urban workers and because fertility policies have been essentially
binding in urban areas. However, note that implementing social security in rural areas would require
an even larger adjustment in contributions since rural workers are currently barely covered by the
pension system.
Technology. One period corresponds to a generation, approximately 23 years. We set the capital
share to a standard value of 0.3. The growth rate of labour augmenting productivity is set to 4.5%
on an annual basis, the average in China over the last thirty years.
Capital Market Frictions. Our model features two types of financial frictions: (1) credit con-
straints and (2) capital controls (financial autarky). Initial credit constraints need to be quite
stringent in order to account for the very low level of household debt in China until 2000 (only 4%
of GDP in 2000) and the very low level of borrowing by young households in the early nineties. A
value of θ = 1% allows us to match the saving rate of individuals under 25, as observed in UHS data
in 1992 (see Coeurdacier, Guibaud and Jin (2014)). This low initial value of θ contributes to depress
the interest rate in the autarky steady state. In our benchmark experiments, we assume that China
remains under financial autarky throughout, but we also perform experiments where China lifts its
capital controls (‘financial integration’). In the latter scenario, we assume that the exogenous world
interest rate R∗ is slightly above the interest rate prevailing in the Chinese autarky steady state—an
assumption based on the observed direction of capital flows from China to the rest of the world
over the last twenty years.15 The world interest rate faced by China under financial integration is
chosen to be 10% (on an annual basis)—which corresponds to a realistic calibration of the model for
a financially developed market, such as the U.S..
Intergenerational Transfers. The replacement rate σ¯ in the initial steady state is set to 30%,
which roughly corresponds to the aggregate urban replacement rate in China in the late nineties,
Data on household debt are taken from McKinsey Global Institute and Federal Reserve. Mortgage debt data comes
from Hypostat (2010) and the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics.
15In reality, since the early nineties, China stands in between financial autarky and complete financial integration,
but our framework is not suitable to accommodate partial integration.
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Table 2: Benchmark Calibration: Structural Parameters and Steady State Values
Benchmark Calibration
Parameter Calibrated Value Target/Description/Data Source
β 0.99 Annual basis
α 30% Capital share
gA − 1 4.5% Annual basis. Productivity growth rate (1980-2010)
θ 1% Saving rate of the 20-25 (UHS)
v 0.136 Targeted to match the fertility rate of 3 in 1970 (Census)
φ 8% Average education expenditures over income (UHS)
ψ0 10% Choukhmane et al. (2014), Curtis et al. (2011)
ω 0.7 Elasticity of transfers to elderly w.r.t the nb. of siblings (CHARLS)
δ 0.3 Semi-elasticity of transfers to elderly w.r.t replacement rate
σ¯ 30% Aggregate initial replacement ratio adjusted for coverage (UHS)
b 0 PAYGO simulation
Alternative Calibration (without family transfers towards elderly)
ψ0 0.1%
v 0.20 Targeted to match the fertility rate of 3 in 1970 (Census)
Autarky Steady State under Benchmark Calibration
nσ¯ 1.50 Fertility of 3
Rσ¯ − 1 9.12% Annual basis
τσ¯ 7.27%
World Interest Rate under Financial Integration
R∗ − 1 10% Annual basis. Based on a reasonable calibration for the U.S.
once adjusting for the extent of social security coverage.16 Transfers received by elderly parents from
their nt children in period t+ 2 are assumed to have the functional form
To,t+2 = Ψ(σt+2)
(
n̟t
̟
)
wm,t+2 ≡ ψ0e
−δσt+2
(
n̟t
̟
)
wm,t+2,
where ψ0 measures the overall degree of ascending altruism in China, δ measures the strength of
the crowding-out effect from social security benefits on intra-family transfers, and 1 −̟ measures
the intensity of free-riding among siblings in providing support to their parents. Using data on
transfers towards parents from the China Health and Retirement Longitudinal Study (CHARLS),
Choukhmane et al. (2014) find that the elasticity of transfers by middle-aged individuals to their
parents with respect to the number of siblings (which corresponds to ̟ − 1) is between −0.3 and
−0.4, leading us to set ̟ = 0.7. Direct empirical measures of δ are not available, and thus we perform
sensitivity analysis with respect to this parameter in Section 4.6. In our benchmark calibration, we
set δ = 0.3—i.e., a 10 percentage points increase in the replacement rate would cause ascending
16Song and Yang (2012) document a replacement rate of about 60-70% in state-owned enterprises, covering 44%
of the urban population in 1992. In the late nineties, at the time of the first pension reform, the Chinese Statistical
Yearbook gives an aggregate replacement (adjusted for coverage) slightly above 30%, while UHS data gives a number
close to 25% in 2002. Note that including rural areas would lower our initial replacement rate: any reform to increase
benefits/coverage would require an even larger rise in contributions to sustain the pension system.
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intra-family transfers to drop by about 3%.17 Given ̟, δ and σ¯, the ascending altruism parameter
ψ0 is set to 10%: a middle-aged individual with two siblings transfers about 11% of his wage income
to his parents, in the ballpark of estimates from micro data (see Choukhmane et al. (2014), Curtis
et al. (2011)).18 Finally, based on the Urban Household Survey, transfers to children for education
purposes amount to about 8% of household income, therefore φ is set to 8% (see Banerjee et al.
(2013) for a similar value).
Preferences. We set β = 0.99 on an annual basis. The parameter v, which governs the preference
for children, is set to 0.136 in order match the fertility rate in China before the implementation
of fertility controls (roughly 3 children per household in 1970). In the corresponding initial steady
state, the contribution rate τσ¯ necessary to finance the social security system under PAYGO (b = 0
and σ¯ = 0.3) is equal to 7.3%.19
Alternative Calibration. In order to illustrate the role of ascending intra-family transfers, we run
some of the experiments under an alternative calibration, in which we set ψ0 = 0.1%, and adjust
the preference for children v accordingly to generate the same fertility rate in the initial steady
state—yielding v = 0.20. Relative to the benchmark calibration, this corresponds to a situation
where children are more consumption goods, and less investment goods.
In the policy experiments that follow, we perform numerical simulations assuming that the gov-
ernment targets a certain path of social security benefits {σt}. The objective is to assess how the
economy would adjust to shocks if the generosity of the existing system is increased (or at least main-
tained). The model dynamics are governed by Equations (4), (11) and (12). For most experiments
we make the PAYGO assumption, bt = 0. Robustness checks with respect to model parameters and
other social security schemes (trust fund) are relegated to Section 4.6.
4.3 Fertility and Social Security Policies
We focus first on the two main pending reforms on the policy agenda in China: (1) the relaxation of
the one-child policy and (2) the increase in social security benefits.
The One-Child Policy and its Relaxation. We first investigate the dynamics of the model as
the government relaxes the one-child policy for the coming generations of parents. The economy
starts of at t = 1 (1970) from its autarkic steady-state with endogenous fertility. We assume that
fertility is constrained to one child per household for one generation in period t = 2 (corresponding
17Cai, Giles and Meng (2006) provide an indirect measure of δ for China. In the cross section, they find that when
elderly income (before family transfer) increases by 1 yuan, support from children falls by 0.25 yuan (see also Chapter
3 in Cai et al. (2012) and Cox et al. (2004) for similar evidence in the context of the Philippines). Cox et al. (2004)
also provide evidence that the presence of retirement benefits crowds out ascending transfers from children.
18Data on pecuniary transfers from CHARLS would imply a lower ψ0, around 5-6% as many transfers towards elderly,
such as co-residence or healthcare, are non-pecuniary. Restricting our attention to children that are not living with
their parents, we find that they transfer about 10% of their wage income, in line with our calibration. Choukhmane
et al. (2014) also show that transfers have to be an order of magnitude larger than observed pecuniary ones to match
age-saving profiles in China.
19This is comparable to the current 13% payroll tax paid by employers given that about half of the urban population
is covered.
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to the mid-nineties), and then fully relaxed at t = 3 (i.e in the very near future). Figure 3 displays
the dynamics of the interest rate, fertility and taxes.
The one-child policy leads to a large rise in savings (net of investment) and a required tax hike in
t = 4 when the one-child generation becomes the main contributor to social security. The large rise in
savings occasions a large fall in the interest rate, followed by a gradual rise– as the fertility constraint
is relaxed. Required tax hikes are large and long-lasting, as fertility is persistently below steady-
state after the relaxation of the policy (in period t = 4, fertility is around 2.5 for a tax rate of 15%).
These results derive from two feedback loops. As per children being consumption goods—higher
tax rates feed into lower consumption and lower fertility– and thus back onto higher taxes. As per
children being investment goods—the relaxation of the policy increases interest rates by raising the
marginal productivity of capital, hence restricting the rise in fertility. Without this latter feedback
effect, fertility reverts faster to its steady state— as shown in the alternative calibration in which
intra-family transfers towards the elderly are absent.
Figure 3: The One-Child Policy and its Relaxation.
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Notes: The solid (resp. dashed) line corresponds to the benchmark (resp. alternative) calibration. Parameters values
are shown in Table 2. The one-child policy is implemented at t=2 and relaxed at t=3.
A Rise in the Replacement Ratio. In addition to relaxing the one-child policy, China is currently
expanding the coverage of its social security system. While the government’s objective is to attain
full coverage, the corresponding targeted replacement rate, intended to be lower than the current
one, is difficult to assess. We assume that all urban workers will be covered under the reformed
system (thus doubling the coverage), at a replacement rate about 15-20 percentage points below its
current level.20 This reform is tantamount to a rise in the aggregate replacement ratio in our model.
20This is consistent with the early pension reforms of the late nineties. Starting at very high level for covered
workers, the replacement ratio recently fell in China by 10 to 15% depending on the region/sector, while coverage has
20
The experiment we analyze involves a rise in σ¯ from its initial value of 30% to 50% at t = 3, which
coincides with the period when the one-child policy is relaxed. Results for the combination of these
two policies are shown in Figure 4 and constitutes our benchmark experiment.
While the relaxation of fertility constraints may help alleviate the fiscal pressure brought about
by the one-child policy, our simulations show that fertility remains permanently lower after the social
security reforms—and particularly so if intra-family transfers are important. Fertility is around 2 at
t = 4 in our benchmark calibration (and only 2.4 one generation after) compared to more than 2.5
at t = 4 (and 2.9 at t = 5) in the alternative calibration.
Figure 4: Benchmark Experiment: Relaxation of the OCP and a Rise in the Replacement Ratio.
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Notes: The solid (resp. dashed) line corresponds to the benchmark (resp. alternative) calibration. Parameters values
are shown in Table 2. The one-child policy is implemented at t=2 and relaxed at t=3. The replacement ratio is
increased permanently at t=3 from σ¯ = 30% to σ¯ = 50%.
On top of the effects caused by the one-child policy, a rise in replacement rates triggers a rise
in interest rates which reduces fertility. Fertility is therefore particularly depressed if intra-family
transfers are important—since it becomes more sensitive to the rise in interest rates. Moreover, the
rise in replacement rates crowds out intra-family transfers, depressing further fertility. Finally, taxes
must rise to stabilize the government budget as replacement rates are higher and fertility lower. The
required tax hike exerts additional continual downward pressure on fertility. In the long term, as the
generation of only child goes into retirement, taxes fall but remain persistently higher (taxes increase
to roughly 27% at t = 4 and stay close to 20% one generation after, well above the initial steady
state). In sum, despite the relaxation of the one-child policy, taxes remain very high and fertility
permanently depressed. This dynamic effects of the policy reform would be absent in a model with
been increasing—such that overall Chinese households are better insured for their old age (see ISSA Report (2013)).
Estimates of the World Bank suggest to set a replacement rate of 40% for the sustainability of the system (see Sin
(2005)) while the early pension reforms are targeting 60%.
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exogenous fertility (or largely mitigated in a model without intra-family support).
We are interested in the dynamic effects of reforms following the one-child policy while the
government is at the same time trying to raise social security benefits. Thus, unless stated otherwise,
all subsequent simulations include the shocks to fertility (at t = 2) and the increase in the replacement
rate (at t = 3)— as in our benchmark experiment.
4.4 Capital Markets Reforms
We now investigate how other plausible policy reforms in China interact with social security policy
and the relaxation of the one-child policy. In particular, two reforms of the capital markets are
of particular relevance: (1) financial liberalization within China and (2) financial integration with
the rest of the world. For these simulations, the benchmark calibration is considered. For com-
parison purposes, also shown is the path of variables without these additional reforms (benchmark
experiment).
Financial Liberalization. In our framework, domestic financial liberalization can be understood
qualitatively as a rise in θ. It can also be more broadly interpreted as any reform that aims to raise
the latently repressed interest rate.21 The experiment we analyze consists in increasing θ from its
initial value of 1% to 10% at t = 3 (when the one-child policy is relaxed and social security reforms
are implemented).22 Results are shown in Figure 5.
Compared to the benchmark experiment without financial liberalization, fertility is further de-
pressed (below 2 at t = 4 and t = 5) and taxes persistently higher. As the rise in θ lowers savings
and exerts upward pressure on the interest rate, the rise in fertility is further contained after the
relaxation of the one-child policy. This requires the government to set higher taxes to sustain its
pension reform, depressing fertility further (and so on and so forth).23 Thus, the policy reforms face
an important trade-off: the persistence of the one-child policy shock makes the government’s inten-
tions to liberalize its financial markets and implement its pension reforms potentially problematic.
Note that such a trade-off would be absent in a model with exogenous fertility (and largely mitigated
in a model where intra-family transfers towards old-age are unimportant).24
Financial Integration. In our framework, financial integration can be understood as China lifting
its capital controls, so that the return to capital faced by domestic households and the world interest
rate are equalized (Small Open Economy case). We assume that when liberalizing its capital account
at t = 3, China opens up to a world with a higher interest rate R∗ = 10% on an annual basis. Results
21Our financial friction depresses interest rates and drives a wedge between the frictionless interest rate and the
equilibrium one. This is qualitatively equivalent to a price distortion due to regulated interest rates. A difference though
is that our friction does not generate budget surplus for the government. This implies that, unlike our experiment, a
fall in price distortions (interest rate liberalization) would be even more harmful for the government’s budget.
22Strictly speaking, such a reform implies that households are allowed to borrow ten times more. Such a shock can
appear large but note that over the period 2000-2010, household debt (as a share of GDP) in China was multiplied by
3 following, in particular, the mortgage reform in the late nineties. See Coeurdacier, Guibaud and Jin (2014).
23Note that the equilibrium interest rate is almost unaffected by financial liberalization, despite the relaxation of
credit constraints, due to the countervailing effect of lower fertility and higher taxes.
24In our alternative calibration, fertility reverts back much faster and is less affected by the financial liberalization
(not shown). This is so because family-transfers are essential to make fertility interest rate sensitive.
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Figure 5: Domestic Financial Liberalization.
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Notes: The dashed (resp. solid) line corresponds to the experiment with domestic financial liberalization (resp. the
benchmark experiment without financial liberalization). Parameters values are shown in Table 2. The one-child policy
is implemented at t=2 and relaxed at t=3. The replacement ratio is increased permanently at t=3 from σ¯ = 30% to
σ¯ = 50%. Domestic financial liberalization (a rise of θ to 10%) occurs at t = 3.
Figure 6: Financial Integration.
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Notes: The solid (resp. dashed) line corresponds to the experiment with financial integration (resp. the benchmark
experiment without financial integration). Parameters values are shown in Table 2. The one-child policy is implemented
at t=2 and relaxed at t=3. The replacement ratio is increased permanently at t=3 from σ¯ = 30% to σ¯ = 50%. Financial
integration occurs at t = 3.
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of the simulation under the benchmark calibration are shown in Figure 6, together with the autarky
paths in our benchmark experiment.
We observe first that the rise in interest rates following integration triggers a fall in fertility (and
higher taxes). Second, the mechanism that tends to ease social security pressure under autarky
—whereby lower interest rates feeds into higher fertility—–is now absent. Fertility is therefore even
lower in an open economy, which implies substantially larger tax rates (at t = 4, taxes reach almost
40%). The impact of the one-child policy shock, together with an increase in pension coverage, is
significantly more costly if capital controls are lifted.25 Thus, China faces another policy trade-off:
opening up capital markets will exert pressure on the sustainability of the PAYGO system that the
government wishes to expand.
4.5 Alternative Growth Scenarios
Growth has been remarkably high in China over the last thirty years, facilitating the recent expansion
of social security coverage. Yet a growth slowdown is a likely scenario. We now examine the impact
of the main policy experiments against the background of a permanent growth slowdown.
A Permanent Slowdown in Growth. Our next simulation superimposes to the benchmark
experiment a permanent fall in productivity growth from an annual rate of 4.5% to 2.5% (occurring
at t = 3). Results are displayed in Figure 7. The path from the benchmark experiment (without
growth slowdown) is shown for comparison purposes.
Compared to the benchmark case, the fall in the growth rate leads to a permanently lower fertility
rate and interest rate. As a consequence, higher taxes are required to balance the budget —in turn
restraining the rise in fertility ensuing the relaxation of the one-child policy. The combined effects
of aging (of the generation of the only child) and the fall in growth exerts a very high pressure on
the viability of the pension system — forcing taxes to rise progressively from 19% at t = 3 to 42% at
t = 5, before reverting slightly as the generation of only child ages. Due to the feedback loop from
higher taxes to lower fertility, fertility stays permanently depressed, significantly below 2 at t = 4
and t = 5. The predicament of these circumstances cast serious doubt on whether China is able to
pursue its pension reforms.
It is also important to note that the effects of growth are strongly amplified by the presence of
intra-family transfers: lower growth implies a lower return from children—thus depressing fertility.
When running the same experiment under the alternative calibration (with ψ0 = 0.1%), we find that
fertility converges much more rapidly (close to 2.2 at t = 3 and 2.5 at t = 4), as it is much less
sensitive to growth. This tends to place less pressure on the social security system.26
Capital Market Reforms in the Event of a Growth Slowdown. We now investigate the
dynamics of the model with domestic financial liberalization (resp. financial integration), occurring
at t = 3, when the economy concurrently slows down.27 It turns out that the social security system
25Note that our findings constitute an upper-bound of the fiscal costs of financial integration since China, being a
fairly large economy, would induce the world interest rate to adjust somewhat.
26The key parameter determining the response of fertility to a change in growth over the interest rate (gA/R) is ψσ.
When intra-family transfers are important (high ψσ), a growth slowdown triggers a larger fall in fertility.
27Domestic financial liberalization is modeled as before—a rise in θ from its initial value of 1% to 10%.
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Figure 7: A Permanent Slowdown in Growth.
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Notes: The dashed (resp. solid) line corresponds to the experiment with a permanent slowdown in growth (resp. the
benchmark experiment without a permanent slowdown in growth). Parameters values are shown in Table 2. The
one-child policy is implemented at t=2 and relaxed at t=3. The replacement ratio is increased permanently at t=3
from σ¯ = 30% to σ¯ = 50%. At t = 3, productivity growth falls permanently from 4.5% to 2.5%.
with a high replacement ratio of σ¯ = 50% is no longer sustainable and cannot be financed. The
upward pressure on interest rates driven by capital markets reforms amplifies the fall in fertility,
leading to an even larger rise in taxes, feeding back into even lower fertility. The government ends
up not being able to finance its increased spending on social security, and the system collapses.28
The impact of a permanently slower growth is thus very costly for social security sustainability if
the government simultaneously liberalizes financial markets.
This implies that the Chinese government can face a serious tension between expanding the
generosity of the existing pension system and deepening its capital markets. Even maintaining the
current social security program becomes difficult: if the replacement ratio remains at its initial value
of 30% (Fig. 8), there is still strong downward pressure on fertility and upward pressure on taxes—in
both cases of domestic financial liberalization (solid line), or lifting capital controls (dashed line).
Financial integration presents greater challenges since the counteracting effect of a fall in interest
rates is absent in the open economy and thus the drop in fertility is larger.29
Extending the analysis under financial integration to a large open economy model would imply
considerable international consequences: the world interest rate could be persistently depressed under
this scenario–due to low growth, high taxes and low fertility in China.
28This echoes Lemma A-1 which states that social security is sustainable up to certain threshold in the replacement
rate. Again, intra-family transfers are essential for this result, such a bankruptcy of the social security system does not
happen in the alternative calibration.
29Alternatively, one can calculate the maximum replacement ratio that China can implement under such a growth
scenario while implementing domestic financial liberalization (resp. financial integration); we find σ¯ very close to 45%
in both cases.
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Figure 8: Capital Markets Reforms in the Event of a Growth Slowdown (Without Pension Reforms).
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Notes: The solid (resp. dashed) line corresponds to the experiment with a permanent slowdown in growth and domestic
financial liberalization, i.e., a rise of θ to 10% (resp. the experiment with a permanent slowdown in growth and financial
integration). Parameters values are shown in Table 2. The one-child policy is implemented at t=2 and relaxed at t=3.
The replacement ratio is kept constant throughout at σ¯ = 30%. Domestic financial liberalization (resp. financial
integration) occurs at t = 3. At t = 3, productivity growth falls permanently from 4.5% to 2.5%.
4.6 Sensitivity Analysis and Discussion
Alternative Social Security Schemes. We investigate how our results depend on the social
security scheme under consideration. An alternative scenario moving away from a PAYGO system
is the presence of a trust fund, whereby a government accumulates positive assets (b > 0) to smooth
negative demographic (or productivity) shocks over time, by partly selling its stock of assets. We
assume that the government in China starts out initially without assets but increases contribution
taxes of the current generation of middle-aged and accumulates assets up to b = 3.7% at t = 3—
before the generation of only children ages. Such a value for b allows the government to share the tax
burden between the current and future generation of workers just about equally.30 The government
is then assumed to exhaust its trust fund in two generations, reaching b = 0 at t = 6.
To build intuition, it is helpful to consider the impact of the existence of the trust fund on
the autarky steady state. With a higher b, the interest rate is lower (KK shifts upwards) and the
fertility rate higher; conversely, reducing the size of the trust fund raises the interest rate and lowers
fertility in the steady state. Thus, when building a trust fund to smooth the shocks, the government
increases taxes for the current generation of workers but fertility will be higher (and taxes lower)
for the coming generations. This is illustrated in Figure 9 together with the benchmark experiment
(PAYGO): tax contributions increases significantly for the current generation but less so at t = 4,
30In our model, b is a small share of GDP due to a low capital output ratio in a model with full depreciation and
three periods only while still corresponding to a significant share of the total capital stock.
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reaching 17.5% (compared to 27% in our benchmark experimentation). As a consequence, fertility
catches up faster and stays persistently higher. Similar findings hold under an experiment involving
a permanent growth slowdown.
Figure 9: Tax Smoothing with a Trust Fund.
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Notes: Structural parameters are shown in Table 2. The one-child policy is implemented at t=2 and relaxed at t=3.
The replacement ratio is increased permanently at t=3 from σ¯ = 30% to σ¯ = 50%. In the trust fund scenario (dashed
line), China starts at b = 0 but accumulate assets b = 3.7% at t = 3 before running down the fund such that b = 0.75%
at t = 4, 0.25% at t = 5 before reaching 0 at t = 6. The benchmark experiment (solid line) corresponds to b = 0
throughout.
If the government undergoes capital market reforms in the presence of a trust fund, the costs
of these reforms are also mitigated. If the government accumulates a fund, any increase in the
interest rate (due to domestic financial liberalization or financial integration) will tend to relax its
budget constraint. Capital markets reforms are thus less costly for the government. A similar
simulation (not shown) where the government accumulates b > 0 at t = 3 shows that taxes are lower
in the subsequent periods under financial integration than under autarky (and barely increasing
following financial liberalization): the fall in revenues due to the induced drop in fertility is more
than compensated by an increase resulting from the higher return on government assets. The feedback
loop from higher taxes to lower fertility is thus not in operation, and fertility is higher under financial
integration. Taxes (resp. fertility) can also stay at a persistently lower (resp. higher) level than in
autarky by running down the trust fund at a slow pace as long as foreign returns are high. This
experiment demonstrates that the negative effects of financial integration (and to a lesser extent
domestic financial liberalization) can be significantly alleviated if the government can accumulate a
trust fund by taxing the current generation.
Sensitivity Analysis. We investigate the sensitivity of our results to parameters δ and φ, both of
which affect private transfers. The parameter δ measures the intensity of the crowding out of social
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security on family transfers. We replicate our benchmark experiment with δ = 0 and with δ = 0.6.
Differences with our benchmark simulation are very moderate. With δ = 0, fertility is about 0.1
higher all along the transition compared to a simulation with δ = 0.6. Respectively, taxes are at
most 1% higher in the latter calibration. Increasing δ has ambiguous effects in our model: on the
one hand, a higher δ makes fertility more responsive to an increase in the replacement rate (crowding
out effect); on the other, it also increases savings, lowering the interest rate, and thus raises fertility.
For our benchmark calibration, δ exerts little effect on the dynamics of the model.
The parameter φ measures the cost of raising kids as a fraction of wages and is assumed to be
constant over the whole period in our simulations. Recent trends in China suggest that, since 2000,
schooling costs and tuition fees have been rising at a fast pace, particularly so in higher education
(Dong and Wan (2012)).31 If this trend were to continue, natural fertility might fall by even more
than our experiments predict. In a simulation of the model where φ is assumed to increase by 25%
at t = 3 (not shown), we find that fertility is 0.4 below our benchmark counterpart at t = 4, and
taxes about 5% higher— amplifying significantly our findings.
Discussion and Caveats. The model is kept parsimonious in order to extract the importance
of endogenous fertility in impacting the economy subjected to various shocks—particularly in the
presence of intra-family transfers. One could argue though that other margins of adjustment, such as
human capital accumulation, labor supply, rural-urban migrations —to name a few, could attenuate
some of these effects. We discuss some of these extensions although an in-depth study is left for
future studies.
Human Capital Accumulation. If parents can substitute ‘quantity’ for ‘quality’—by raising their only
child’s human capital through education investment — the rise in the financing costs of the social
security system as a result of the policy can be mitigated to a degree. As Choukhmane et al. (2014)
show, the one-child policy shock tends to foster rapid human capital accumulation of the only child.
However, the argument can be reversed when the policy is relaxed and the social security benefits
rise. In particular, increasing social security coverage could depress the return on human capital
investment by lowering expected transfers from children—thus exacerbating the fiscal costs of the
policy. The interaction of fertility with social security—while incorporating human capital— is left
for further research.
Labour Supply. Labor supply responses to various shocks could also mitigate the difficulties in
implementing the pension reform. In particular, a persistent fall in fertility could potentially lead
to an increase in labor market participation—especially for women—though this effect is not found
to be very significant (see He and Zhu (2013)). Older people might also remain active for longer
in response to a fall in support from children at retirement. Cai et al. (2012) show that this is
particularly relevant for rural areas, because the lack of social safety nets compels individuals in
their sixties to rely still heavily on their labor income. In urban areas, according to UHS data, labor
income is a negligible fraction of income for individuals above 60, and retirement ages are strictly
31According to data from the Bureau of China Statistics (2012), the per capita higher education tuition and fees
continued to increase over time. Between 1997-2008, the per capita tuition and fees steadily increased with an average
annual growth rate of 14.4%.
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observed. Conversely, a rise in replacement rates might trigger a fall in labor market participation
of older workers, and thus the overall impact of policy reforms in China on aggregate labour supply
remains unclear.
Rural and Urban Migrations. Our framework does not allow for a dual economy with a rural-urban
divide, although it would be a natural extension for the case of China. Without harmonization in
pension entitlements between rural and urban areas, high migration rates towards cities would help
advance the reform in urban areas by increasing the urban working population and contributions
(Song et al. (2013)). Naturally, the more universal is the reform, the less helpful internal migrations
are. However, a more universal reform might also change incentives for migrations, which might
interact with its financing. One particular feature of the current pension system is that most rural
migrants (non-hukou migrants) are excluded from social security. As the intended reforms plan to
remedy this issue, the benefits of migration may become higher and labour supply in cities further
boosted. The fact that urban areas pay higher wages means that the required tax adjustment
may be smaller. The quantitative importance of such feedback effects remains to be established
—particularly in China where migrations are subject to heavy administrative regulations.
5 Conclusion
The Chinese government has ambitious plans to expand its social security system to reach full
national coverage. But its recent decision to relax its prolonged one-child policy may not be as
helpful in this process as one would expect. In a framework with endogenous fertility where notions
of intergenerational support within families are strong, we show that an expansion of social security
access/benefits exerts downward pressure on desired fertility—and in turn, offsets some of the positive
effect that abandoning the one-child policy has on fertility. This countervailing force is stronger the
more important are intra-family transfers in an economy.
Moreover, the government may face implicit policy tradeoffs. Seemingly disparate policy reforms,
such as capital market reforms and the pension reform can in fact interact, and in such a way that
makes carrying out the social security expansion particularly difficult—in spite of relaxing fertility
controls. The rise in interest rates with financial liberalization and financial integration further de-
presses fertility. Implementing the pension reforms thus becomes more costly—and even more so if
China experiences a growth slowdown. These negative effects of growth are amplified by the effects
of intergenerational transfers. And in plausible circumstances, the social security reform may be
entirely infeasible if the government also chooses to reform its domestic capital market at the same
time.
The realistic importance of these feedback loops arising from the interlinkages between interest
rates, fertility, and social security can only be illuminated by a more in-depth quantitative investi-
gation that our stylized model is not fully-equipped to undertake. But what our analyses show is
that allowing for endogenous fertility responses may be key, particularly in the context of pension
reforms. Predictions of the magnitude and the dynamics of the requisite fiscal adjustments for ex-
panding social security are very different in models with exogenous fertility. These adjustments also
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seem to be distinct in economies in which children are more akin to ‘consumption goods’ compared
to economies in which they are also ‘investment goods’.
International spillovers onto other economies —potentially very dissimilar in terms of financial
development, pension systems, or the role of children — constitute a natural and relevant extension
to consider (as in Fehr et al. (2007) and Attanasio et al. (2007)). As China is becoming ever larger
and more important in the world economy, its particular policy choices and growth scenarios will
undoubtedly have an important bearing on the world economy.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1: Define
n ≡ λ
1− τ − θ − ψσ
φ
,
n ≡
1− τ − θ − ψσ
φ
+
1 + β
β(1− α)
b > n.
Note that RKK(n) is strictly positive and finite if and only if n < n, while RNN (n) is strictly positive
and finite if and only if n > n. Also note that
0 < lim
n↓n
RKK(n) < lim
n↓n
RNN (n) =∞,
0 < lim
n↑n
RNN (n) < lim
n↑n
RKK(n) =∞.
The steady state (R,n) is such that RKK(n) = RNN (n) = R. The KK and NN curves are increasing
and decreasing, respectively, guaranteeing that their intersection is unique. The equilibrium fertility
rate lies in (n, n), and R > 0.
Lemma A-1 For any target replacement ratio σ¯ that satisfies
σ¯ <
(1− θ − ψσ¯)
2 gA
4φ
(
2λΘ+ 2(λ+ β)ψσ¯ + λ(1 + β)(1− θ − ψσ¯)
2Θ + 2(1 + β)ψσ¯ + (1 + βλ)(1 − θ − ψσ¯)
)
, (A-1)
there exists a steady state equilibrium under PAYGO. Moreover, if (1 − λ)ψσ¯ < λΘ and if the
contribution rate is constrained to remain below τmaxσ¯ ≡
1−θ−ψσ¯
2 , then the steady state equilibrium is
unique.
Equation (A-1) provides implicity an upper bound for σ¯.
Proof of Lemma A-1: To start with, consider a PAYGO system at steady state with contribution
rate τ > 0. Setting b = 0 and using (15) to substitute σ = ngAτ in (13) and (14), we can solve for
the equilibrium fertility and interest rate, each expressed as a function of τ :
n (τ) =
(1− τ − θ − ψσ¯)
φ
(
λΘ+ (λ+ β)ψσ¯ + λ(1 + β)τ
Θ+ (1 + β)ψσ¯ + (1 + βλ)τ
)
R (τ) =
(
gA
βφ
)(
λΘ+ (λ+ β)ψσ¯ + λ(1 + β)τ
1− λ
)
.
Now suppose the government targets a replacement rate σ¯ > 0. The steady state equilibrium triplet
(nσ¯, Rσ¯, τσ¯) must satisfy
nσ¯ = n(τσ¯), Rσ¯ = R(τσ¯), τσ¯ =
σ¯
nσ¯gA
.
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Noting that nσ¯ =
σ¯
gAτσ¯
, the equilibrium contribution rate τσ¯ is pinned down by the equation n(τσ¯) =
σ¯
gAτσ¯
, which can also be written F (τσ¯) = G(τσ¯), where
F (τ) ≡ τ(1− τ − θ − ψσ¯) G(τ) ≡
φσ¯
gA
(
Θ+ (1 + β)ψσ¯ + (1 + βλ)τ
λΘ+ (λ+ β)ψσ¯ + λ(1 + β)τ
)
.
The function F is concave, starts at zero at τ = 0, initially increases to reach a maximum at 1−θ−ψσ¯2
F
(
1− θ − ψσ¯
2
)
=
(1− θ − ψσ¯)
2
4
≡ Fmaxσ¯ ,
and then decreases, crossing zero again at τ = 1− θ−ψσ¯ . The function G is always strictly positive.
Moreover, differentiating G yields
G′(τ) =
φσ¯
gA
β(1− λ) [(1− λ)ψσ¯ − λΘ]
[λΘ+ (λ+ β)ψσ¯ + λ(1 + β)τ ]
2 ,
and
G′′(τ) = −2
φσ¯
gA
λ(1 + β)β(1 − λ) [(1 − λ)ψσ¯ − λΘ]
[λΘ+ (λ+ β)ψσ¯ + λ(1 + β)τ ]
3 .
Therefore G is strictly increasing and concave if (1 − λ)ψσ¯ > λΘ, it is constant if (1 − λ)ψσ¯ = λΘ,
and it is strictly decreasing and convex if (1−λ)ψσ¯ < λΘ. In any of these configurations, a sufficient
condition for the function F and G to cross at least once is G
(
1−θ−ψσ¯
2
)
≤ Fmaxσ¯ , which is equivalent
to (A-1). This condition implicitly provides an upper bound on σ¯. When it is satisfied, there exists at
least one value of τ ≤ 1−θ−ψσ¯2 such that F (τ) = G(τ). If moreover (1− λ)ψσ¯ < λΘ, the intersection
is unique, which pins down a unique equilibrium contribution rate τσ¯ < τ
max
σ¯ . In the case several
equilibria exist, we focus on the one with the lowest contribution rate. The equilibrium fertility and
interest rate are determined by nσ¯ = n(τσ¯) and Rσ¯ = R(τσ¯).
Proof of Proposition 2. From Lemma A-1, an equilibrium must satisfy:
φσ¯Γ (σ¯)
gAτσ¯
= (1− τσ¯ − θ − ψσ¯) (A-2)
with Γ (σ¯) =
(
Θ+ψσ¯(1+β)+(1+βλ)τσ¯
λΘ+ψσ¯(λ+β)+λ(1+β)τσ¯
)
. We know from Lemma A-1, that there exists (at least) one
solution and τσ¯ ≤
(
1−θ−ψσ¯
2
)
. Rewrite Γ(.) as follows:
Γ (σ¯) = 1 + (1− λ)U (σ¯) ≥ 1
with U (σ¯) =
(
Θ+ψσ¯+τσ¯
ψσ¯β+λ(Θ+ψσ¯)+λ(1+β)τσ¯
)
. We denote ∂x = ∂x
∂σ¯
.
∂U (σ¯) = β
∂τσ¯ ((1− λ)ψσ¯ − λΘ)− ∂ψσ¯ [(1− λ) τσ¯ +Θ]
(ψσ¯ (β + λ) + λΘ+ λ(1 + β)τσ¯)
2
Let us distinguish two cases: U(.) increasing and U(.) potentially decreasing.
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— Case 1. (1− λ)ψσ¯ ≥ λΘ.
Then ∂U (σ¯) > 0 if ∂τσ¯ > 0 (as ∂ψσ¯ ≤ 0). Eq. A-2 is equivalent to:
φnσ¯ =
(1− τσ¯ − ψσ¯ − θ)
1 + (1− λ)U (σ¯)
(A-3)
Differentiating Eq. A-3:
φ∂nσ¯ = −
∂ (τσ¯ + ψσ¯)
1 + (1− λ)U (σ¯)
− (1− λ) ∂U (σ¯)
(1− τσ¯ − ψσ¯ − θ)
(1 + (1− λ)U (σ¯))2
(A-4)
Note that the second term is strictly negative if ∂τσ¯ > 0 and thus ∂ (τσ¯ + ψσ¯) ≥ 0 implies ∂nσ¯ < 0.
Differentiating A-2 leads to:
∂ (τσ¯ + ψσ¯) (1− 2τσ¯ − ψσ¯ − θ) = ∂ψσ¯ (1− τσ¯ − ψσ¯ − θ)+
φ
gA
(1 + (1− λ)U (σ¯))+
φ
gA
σ¯ (1− λ) ∂U (σ¯)
(A-5)
∂ (τσ¯ + ψσ¯) ≥ 0⇔ |∂ψσ¯ | ≤
φ
gA (1− τσ¯ − ψσ¯ − θ)
[(1 + (1− λ)U (σ¯)) + σ¯ (1− λ) ∂U (σ¯)]
The last condition is always verified if |∂ψσ¯ | ≤
φ
gA(1−τσ¯−ψσ¯−θ)
[1 + (1− λ)U (0)] as U(.) is increasing
and ∂U (σ¯) ≥ 0. This last condition is a sufficient condition for ∂nσ¯ < 0.
This also gives an upper bound in the neighborhood of σ¯ = 0:
|∂ψσ¯ | ≤
φ
gA (1− ψ0 − θ)
[1 + (1− λ)U (0)]
Note that due to the convexity of Ψ(.), if this condition is satisfied for σ¯ = 0, it is satisfied for all
(sustainable) σ¯.
— Case 2. (1− λ)ψσ¯ < λΘ
In this case, ∂U (σ¯) can be negative. We still can show in that case that ∂nσ¯ < 0 for σ¯ → 0.
Take the limit of Eq. A-5 when σ¯ → 0:
∂τσ¯ (1− ψ0 − θ) =
φ
gA
(1 + (1− λ)U (0)) +
φ
gA
(1− λ) (σ¯∂U (σ¯))σ¯=0
Using (∂U (σ¯))σ¯=0 = β
∂τσ¯((1−λ)ψ0−λΘ)−∂ψσ¯Θ
(ψ0β+λ(Θ+ψ0))
2 , we get:
∂τσ¯
(
1− ψ0 − θ + (λΘ− (1− λ)ψ0) σ¯
φ
gA
(1− λ)β
(ψ0β + λ (Θ + ψ0))
2
)
=
φ
gA
(1 + (1− λ)U (0))
Thus, for σ¯ → 0,
∂τσ¯ =
φ
gA
(
1 + (1− λ)U (0)
1− ψ0 − θ
)
(A-6)
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Using Eq. A-6, Eq. A-4 can be rewritten as follows for σ¯ → 0:
(ψ0(1 + β) + Θ)φ∂nσ¯ = −∂ψσ¯
[
ψ0 (β + λ) + λΘ−
(1− λ)βΘ(1− ψ0 − θ)
ψ0 (1 + β) + Θ
]
−
φ
gA
[
ψ0(1 + β) + Θ
(1− ψ0 − θ)
+
(1− λ) β ((1− λ)ψ0 − λΘ)
ψ0 (β + λ) + λΘ
]
Note that ψ0(1+β)+Θ(1−ψ0−θ) +
(1−λ)β((1−λ)ψ0−λΘ)
ψ0(β+λ)+λΘ
> 0 if α ≥ β1+2β . To see that, note that this term is
minimal for ψ0 = 0 and equal to:
Θ
1−θ − (1− λ) β. This last term is strictly positive if α ≥
β
1+2β .
Thus ∂nσ¯ < 0 if:
|∂ψσ¯ | ≤
φ [1 + (1− λ)U (0)]
gA (1− ψ0 − θ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1− (1−λ)β(λΘ−(1−λ)ψ0)(1−ψ0−θ)(ψ0(β+λ)+λΘ)(ψ0(1+β)+Θ)
1− (1−λ)βΘ(1−ψ0−θ)(ψ0(1+β)+Θ)((ψ0β+λ(Θ+ψ0)))
∣∣∣∣∣∣
This inequality is strictly satisfied if:
|∂ψσ¯| ≤
φ [1 + (1− λ)U (0)]
gA (1− ψ0 − θ)
(
1− (1− λ) (1− θ)
1− α
α
β
1 + β
)
where the right hand-side is strictly positive for α ≥ β1+2β .
To conclude, under the (realistic) assumption that the condition α ≥ β1+2β is satisfied, let us define
M ≡ [1 + (1− λ)U (0)]
(
1− (1− λ) (1− θ)
1− α
α
β
1 + β
)
> 0. (A-7)
If |∂ψσ¯| <
φ
gA
M , we have ∂nσ¯ < 0 in the neighbourhood of σ¯ = 0 for any value of the parameters
(ψ0, v).
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